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Case No. 20020397-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of a controlled substance 
(marijuana) with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) and 58-37-8(4)(c) (1998 & Supp. 2002); possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana), a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998 & Supp. 2002); and possession of paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5(l) (1998 & Supp. 2002) (R2-
1). 
This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996 & Supp. 2001). 
'The pleadings file is numbered in reverse chronological order. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Is the evidence sufficient to affirm defendant s conviction for drug trafficking 
where defendant knew his accomplice intended to sell marijuana displayed in their motel 
room, defendant recruited the traffic of young customers to the room, and where 
defendant had marijuana, scales, and over $400 cash on him when arrested? 
2. Does the penalty enhancement provided for in UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(4) 
(1998 & Supp. 2002), violate due process? 
No standard of review applies to these unpreserved issues. "As a general rule, 
claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." State v. Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, ff 11,16,10 P.3d 346. The preservation rule "applies to every claim,... 
unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' 
occurred." Id. at ff 11,14. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally:... possess a controlled or counterfeit 
substance with intent to distribute^] 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(lXaXni) (1998 & Supp. 2002). 
Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized 
under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this 
section,... is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications 
under Subsection (4)(b) if the act is committed:... in a shopping mall, 
sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking 
lot or structure adjacent thereto[.] 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(4)(a)(vii) (1998 & Supp. 2002). 
2 
Ev ery person, acting with the mental state required for the commission 
an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, 
commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in 
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for 
such conduct. 
U i AH CODE AN N .§ 76-2-202(19 99) •  
'• 5 - W - M E N I I HI" H i l l I 'I S I •' ' . ' ••' 
Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a 
second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-8(lXaX"0 a n d 58-?7™ 
v iolation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998 & Supp, 2002); ;ttic1 possess M * 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH C 0 ID E !li NN § 58-37a-5(l) 
H11 W.H ik Supp, Mil)(KJ 11, hollowing a jury trial on 19 March 2002, defendant was 
years for the felony conviction and two six-month terms for the misdemeanor convictions 
(R1 (15 -1 < »4 | The trial court then suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R1081 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
lefendanl's au.ompliu.1., l.ilher, iind codetendanl, Kuhcrl 
Rivera, accompanied defendant from New Mexico, to Parowan, Utah, so that defendant 
I he 'facts are recited in the light most 'favorable to the jury verdict See State v. 
.-,^^t?,2000I n 74, f ' i n -*d346. . .-• •  
3 
could appear in court on a disorderly conduct citation (Rl 13:157). Defendant had lived 
in Parowan during his senior year, from July 2000 to August 2001, and graduated from 
Parowan High School (Rl 13:173). During the trip, defendant's father commented that 
the next time they came to Parowan he would bring marijuana to sell (Rl 13:169). 
Accordingly, when defendant and his father again traveled from New Mexico to 
Parowan on 8 December 2001, they had two bricks of marijuana with them (Rl 13:171). 
Upon arriving in Parowan, the duo met up with defendant's school friend Jeff Vanbuskirk 
(Rl 13:130-131,173). At defendant's request, Jeff showed defendant's father where to 
find a "cheap" place to stay in Parowan, the Swiss Village Inn (Rl 13:131,172). 
Defendant's father checked into room #8 (Rl 13:49). Later that afternoon and into the 
evening, the motel owners observed "a lot of traffic, people going in and out of the room, 
. . . just a lot of young kids, basically, going in and out of the room" (Rl 13:50). One of 
the owners also smelled what he thought was "smoke," or "a strange smell coming from 
that room" (id.). 
Defendant's friend Jeff was one of the young people in room #8 off and on 
throughout that day and night (Rl 13:135-136).3 During that time, Jeff saw a marijuana 
brick sitting on a table inside the room (id.). According to Jeff, defendant and his father 
brought the marijuana with them from New Mexico (Rl 13:139). The other young people 
visiting room #8 were also friends of defendant's or had been invited there by defendant 
defendant and Jeff continued to be good friends at the time of trial and defendant 
stayed at Jeffs house during the trial (Rl 13:140-141). 
4 
(Rl 13:141 143) ^\ ccording to the motel owner, the traffic of young people continued 
Defendant s tdther left to go out with Jeffs mother from approximately 7:30 p.m. 
until midnight, so that defendant and Jeff could "hang out with their 'Mends" (Rl 13:158-
III" !") Before leaving, defendant s fathei asked defendant for cash, commenting to Jeffs 
mother that defendant "holds on. to ill ot his ninnov linnitise he wasn't pood \\ iiilh money1' 
(Rl 13:166). •; •. •• •  '• 
The next morning at 11:45 a.m., a motel w orker approached room. #8 tc i emind 
so doing, the motel worker noticed a lot of people and activity in the room (id). Shoitl) 
thereafter, defendant, his father and Jeff left the motel and headed to Brian Head Ski 
#8 a plastic baggie containing marijuana seeds and other material consistent with illicit 
drug packaging (Rl 13:97). The motel owner immediately contacted the local drug task 
force (: -*:). 
ft located defendant*" < »" n1 I'hc i in.Pit sti»p«. |wkp ,v* lot \r ind ? *n p » 
They conducted surveillance on the vehicle until 4 10 p.m. (Rl 13:66, 97-98), During ihat 
time, police observed defendant's fathei in the dn\ cr's seat, in a reclined position 
I llJ I I Wih 'lil UI ip|iiimrriirtH\ -I Hl|iiii tldniNiliiil ind Idt tilnrnnl to the II mil • 
began removing their snowboarding clothes. Defendant's 'father walked to a nearby 
snowboarding shop (R113:5^ ~1~t, 9 r^ Police immediately arrested defendant's father 
5 
and walked him back to the car where defendant and Jeff were also arrested (Rl 13:66, 
99). A search of defendant's snowboarding jacket revealed a small scale commonly used 
to weigh drugs for distribution, a lighter, a marijuana baggie, Zigzag papers, two 
marijuana cigarettes, one package of Camels, and $403.75 in cash (Rl 13:78-79,93). 
A search of defendants' car revealed two marijuana joints in the ash tray and 
hemostats in the center consol (Rl 13:81).4 A tupperware container with crushed 
marijuana inside (approximately 280 milligrams) was found on the passenger side 
floorboard (Rl 13:80,115). Additionally, police found an ice chest containing large 
sandwich bags commonly used for distribution of drugs (Rl 13:82). A search of the trunk 
revealed a red/black duffel bag with another bag inside containing several small baggies 
of marijuana. Under the cardboard bottom of the duffel bag, a one pound marijuana brick 
was discovered (Rl 13:101). In total, 774 grams of marijuana was recovered from room 
#8 and defendants' car (Rl 13:117). 
When asked to whom the red/black duffel bag containing marijuana belonged to, 
defendant's father at first said it belonged to "one of them" (Rl 13:109). When asked for 
clarification, he replied, "Fm not going to let my son take the fall for it" {id.). 
At trial, defendant admitted the red/black duffel belonged to him, but claimed that 
he had let his father borrow it for the trip to Parowan (Rl 13:170). He also admitted that 
he knew about the marijuana bricks in the car and in their motel room (Rl 13:171, 173). 
4Hemostats are used to hold marijuana joints so that one's fingers do not get 
burned while smoking {id.). 
6 
According to defendant, his father also had baggies of marijuana in a shaving kit which 
he intended to sell (Rl 13:174). Defendant explained that the over $400 cash found on his 
person belonged to both he and his father and that it was necessary to carry that large sum 
because "[sjnowboarding is not cheap" (Rl 13:175). He also explained that he had a set 
of scales in his snowboarding jacket because his father had asked him to "hold on to it for 
him" (Rl 13:175). 
Defendant also claimed that while he has been smoking marijuana since he was 
13-years-old, "hardly any of his friends smoke marijuana" (Rl 13:181-182). He also 
denied ever having seen his father "sell any dope" or give it away to anyone other than 
himself (Rl 13:183-184). 
Defendant's father denied telling defendant that he brought marijuana to Parowan 
to sell and claimed he only knew two people in Parowan anyway (Rl 13:187,191). He 
also denied knowing that there were marijuana bricks in the car, that defendant had 
loaned him the red/black duffel bag found to contain marijuana, and that the shaving kit 
with marijuana inside belonged to him (Rl 13:187,189). Defendant's father speculated 
that defendant "must have a set of keys to [his] car since [defendant] stole it in the 
beginning of the week to drive up here in it" (Rl 13:188). Finally, defendant's father 
claimed that he had given defendant only $100 to hold for him during their trip (id.). On 
cross-examination, defendant's father denied seeing marijuana or "weed" in their motel or 
in their car, asking defendant to hold the scale for him, and giving defendant marijuana 
(Rl 13:190-192). 
7 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court should not consider defendant's insufficient evidence claim because he 
failed to preserve the claim below and because he fails to argue plain error or other 
exceptional circumstances on appeal. Even assuming the Court were to overlook these 
twin failures, defendant cannot prevail under the plain error standard. There is at least 
some evidence, which is all that is required under the plain error standard, that defendant 
knowingly and intentionally distributed marijuana, and/or knowingly and intentionally 
aided his accomplice/father in the distribution of marijuana. 
The Court should similarly decline to consider defendant's due process challenge 
to the penalty enhancement because he failed to preserve it below and he fails to argue 
plain error or other exceptional circumstances on appeal. Additionally, defendant's claim 
may be rejected on the ground that it is inadequately briefed, wholly lacking meaningful 
analysis and supporting authority. 
ARGUMENT 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO AFFIRM DEFENDANT'S 
CONVICTION FOR DRUG TRAFFICKING WHERE DEFENDANT 
KNEW HIS ACCOMPLICE/FATHER INTENDED TO SELL 
MARIJUANA DISPLAYED IN THEIR MOTEL ROOM, 
DEFENDANT ALONE INVITED THE TRAFFIC OF YOUNG 
CUSTOMERS TO THE ROOM, AND DEFENDANT HAD 
MARIJUANA, SCALES, AND OVER $400 CASH ON HIM WHEN 
ARRESTED IN THE SKI RESORT PARKING LOT 
In Points MI of his brief, defendant claims the evidence is insufficient to support 
the jury's verdict that he possessed marijuana with the intent to distribute because, while 
8 
he was "aware" of his father's "action" he did not have "control over the circumstances 
and could not have kept his father from acting accordingly," e.g., he did not have keys to 
their vehicle or its trunk. Aplt. Br. at 12-17.5 Thus, defendant concludes that the jury 
unreasonably inferred that he knowingly and intentionally participated in the marijuana 
trafficking scheme. Id. Defendant's self-serving claim is unpreserved and otherwise 
lacks merit. 
A. This Court Should Not Consider Defendant's 
Insufficiency Claim Because He Failed to Preserve it 
Below and Further Fails to Argue Plain Error or 
Exceptional Circumstances on Appeal. 
As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11,10 P.3d 346. This preservation rule "applies 
to every claim, including [sufficiency claims], unless a defendant can demonstrate that 
'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Id. at fl 11,14. 
Here, defendant did not raise his sufficiency claim below. Furthermore, he does 
not argue "exceptional circumstances" or "plain error" on appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 7-13. 
Consequently, this Court should not reach his claim. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 
1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (rejecting defendant's claim that State was required to establish 
certain mens rea at preliminary hearing where defendant did not raise the claim below: 
5Defendant raises no challenge to his misdemeanor convictions for possession of 
marijuana and possession of paraphernalia. Aplt. Br. at 3, 19. 
9 
"Because Pledger does not argue that 'exceptional circumstances' or 'plain error' justifies 
a review of the issue, we decline to consider it on appeal."). 
B. This Court Should not Reach Defendant's Insufficiency 
Claim Because He Fails to Demonstrate an Obvious 
Absence of Supporting Evidence. 
Even if the Court were to overlook defendant's twin failures to either preserve his 
insufficiency claim below, or to argue plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal, 
he cannot prevail. This is because the jury verdict is supported by at least some evidence, 
which is all that the Holgate plain error standard requires. 
Holgate Plain Error Standard. The Holgate plain error standard requires the 
reviewing court to view "the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, and then to determine whether it 'is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which he or she was 
convicted.'" Id. at f 18 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1212 (Utah 1992)). If the 
evidence is determined to be insufficient, the reviewing court must still determine 
"whether the evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental that it was plain error to 
submit the case the jury." Id. In sum, "to establish plain error, a defendant must 
demonstrate first that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime 
charged and second that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial 
court erred in submitting the case to the jury." Id. at f 17. An example of such an obvious 
10 
evidentiary defect "is the case in which the State presents no evidence to support an 
essential element of a criminal charge." Id. 
This Case. The State proceeded on two theories at trial, that defendant knowingly 
and intentionally possessed the marijuana he and father brought from New Mexico with 
the intent to distribute; and/or that defendant knowingly and intentionally aided his father 
in possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute {see R68,63, Jury Instructions ##13, 
18) (copies are contained in the addendum). See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(iii) (1998 & Supp. 2002) and UTAH CODE ANN. 76-2-202 (1999).6 
Defendant admits that he was fully "aware" his father intended to distribute 
marijuana in Parowan, and that the marijuana was displayed and stored in their motel 
room the night preceding his arrest See Aplt. Br. at 11-12. Defendant complains, 
however, that he could not control his father's conduct and that his father was the one 
with the keys to their car. Aplt Br. at 12. Defendant's self-serving view of the evidence 
fails to negate evidence of his own active involvement in the marijuana trafficking 
scheme. 
Indeed, the reasonable inference from the evidence adduced is that defendant and 
his father brought two bricks of marijuana with them from New Mexico to Parowan 
precisely because defendant had many young friends there, having recently graduated 
from Parowan High School (Rl 13:173). It was defendant, not his accomplice/father, who 
6Defendant was not charged as an accomplice {see R2-1); however, an accomplice 
instruction was given without objection at trial {see R63, Jury Instruction #18). 
11 
invited the young customers observed coming and going from the defendants' motel room 
until late in the evening on 8 December 2001 {see, e.g., Rl 13:141-143, 150). After the 
defendants left room #8 the next day to go snowboarding at Brian Head, motel maids 
found marijuana seeds and packaging material in their room (Rl 13:97). When arrested 
later that day in the ski resort parking lot, defendant had on his person a small scale 
commonly used to weigh drugs for distribution, a lighter, a marijuana baggie, Zigzag 
papers, two marijuana cigarettes, and over $400 cash (Rl 13:78-79,93). Police also 
searched the passenger compartment of defendants' car and found two more marijuana 
joints belonging to defendant in the ash-tray and hemostats in the consol (Rl 13:81). See 
Aplt Br. at 12. Police also found an ice chest containing large sandwich bags commonly 
used for distribution of drugs and a tupperware container with marijuana inside on the 
passenger side floorboard (Rl 13:80,82). Defendant admits that the left over or "small 
quantity"of marijuana in the tupperware container was his. Aplt. Br. at 12. 
Given this evidence, defendant was more than merely present in the passenger 
compartment of the car and motel room where the marijuana and paraphernalia was 
openly displayed; rather, he was actively involved in the marijuana trafficking scheme. 
See State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386,1388 (Utah App. 1991) (recognizing that a suspect's 
"incriminating statements, suspicious or incriminating behavior, sale of drugs, use of 
drugs, proximity [to] drugs, drugs in plain view" and "drugs on defendant's person" all 
"tend[] to link an accused with drugs"). Defendant's accomplice/father may have had the 
keys to their car, but defendant handled all other aspects of the trafficking scheme from 
12 
recruiting their young customers, to handling transactions, and keeping track of their 
profits.7 
Defendant's Authority Distinguished. Defendant primarily relies on State v. 
Layman, 985 P.2d 911 (Utah 1999). While Layman involves the sufficiency of evidence 
to establish possession with intent to distribute, the sufficiency question in Layman did 
not arise in either an accomplice or a plain error context. Id. at 914. Moreover, the drugs 
and paraphernalia in Layman were found solely on a person other than Layman. Id. The 
only evidence that Layman exercised constructive possession of the contraband was that 
the other person "looked at [Layman] when the deputy requested to see the pouch" on her 
person, subsequently found to contain drugs and paraphernalia. Id. 
Here, as set forth above, marijuana, packaging materials, and paraphernalia were 
found inside the passenger compartment of defendants' car, their motel room, and on 
defendant's person (see, e.g., Rl 13:78-79, 81-82, 93,101,117). Even given the self-
serving finger-pointing in this case, there is more inculpatory evidence against defendant 
here than against Layman. The finger-pointing in this case only raises an issue whether 
defendant or his accomplice/father exercised greater dominion and control over their 
marijuana. It does not negate that defendant exercised some control over the marijuana or 
that he acted as an accomplice. It is undisputed that it was defendant who invited the 
flood of young customers seen visiting room #8 until the late evening hours on 8 
7According to defendant's accomplice/father, defendant also had keys to the car 
(R113:188). 
13 
December 2001 (see, e.g., Rl 13:141-143). As set forth previously, that evidence, 
together with evidence that marijuana was openly displayed and packaged in the motel 
room, and that, at the time of his arrest, defendant had scales, marijuana and an unusually 
large sum of cash on his person, gives rise to the eminently reasonable inference that 
defendant, at the very least, intentionally and knowingly aided in a marijuana trafficking 
scheme. Layman is thus distinguishable and does not control the instant outcome. 
In sum, there is a "sufficient nexus" between defendant and the marijuana to 
permit the inference that he had both the power and intent to exercise dominion and 
control over the marijuana trafficking scheme, or at least to aid his accomplice/father in 
so doing. Sal as, 820 P.2d at 1388. Defendant has not and cannot show that there is no 
evidence of his knowing and intentional involvement Thus, there is no obvious 
insufficiency and his conviction should be affirmed Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ffl| 14-17. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REACH DEFENDANT'S DUE 
PROCESS CHALLENGE TO THE PENALTY ENHANCEMENT 
BECAUSE HE FAILED TO PRESERVE IT BELOW AND 
FURTHER FAILS TO ARGUE PLAIN ERROR OR EXCEPTIONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES ON APPEAL 
In Point III of his brief, defendant challenges the enhancement of his conviction 
for possession with intent to distribute to a second degree felony on the grounds that it 
violates his right to due process. Aplt. Br. at 19. For the same reasons the Court should 
not reach defendant's sufficiency challenge, the Court should not reach his challenge to 
the penalty enhancement—it is unpreserved. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11 ("As a general 
14 
rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal."). The 
preservation rule "applies to every claim,... unless a defendant can demonstrate that 
'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Id. at ffl[ 11, 14. 
Here, defendant neglects to show that he preserved any challenge to the penalty 
enhancement in the record on appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 1-2. See also Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(5)(A) (requiring appellant to provide "citation to the record showing that the issue 
was preserved in the trial court). Furthermore, he does not argue "exceptional 
circumstances" or "plain error" on appeal. See Aplt Br. at 17-19. See also Utah R. App. 
P. 24(a)(5)(A) (requiring appellant to provide a statement of grounds seeking review of an 
issue not preserved in the trial court"). Consequently, this Court should not reach this 
challenge. Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5. 
Even overlooking defendant's waiver, his claim is inadequately briefed and can be 
rejected on this additional ground. See State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 
1998) ("Utah courts routinely decline to consider inadequately briefed arguments"). Not 
only does he fail to support his claim in the record, he neglects to support his challenge 
with any legal authority, let alone meaningful analysis. See Aplt. Br. at 17-19. See also 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("An argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including . . . citations to the authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied on."); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960,996 (Utah 
1989) (declining to address argument on the ground that defendant's brief "wholly lacks 
legal analysis and authority to support his argument"). Indeed, nowhere in defendant's 
15 
brief does he attempt to fit his claim into an analytical framework relating to the claimed 
lack of notice regarding the penalty enhancement. Aplt. Br. at 19. Absent such analysis, 
defendant cannot show a constitutional violation, be it due process or any other. This 
Court should therefore refuse to consider his claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's jury conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on J_ January 2003. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
IARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Before you may find Defendant IAN RIVERA, guilty of the offense of Unlawful Possession 
of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, to wit: Marijuana, as charged in Count I of the 
Information, the State must prove and you must find, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, 
each and every one of the following elements: 
1. That the Defendant acted knowingly and intentionally; 
2. That the Defendant did possess the controlled substance marijuana; 
3. That the Defendant possessed said marijuana with the intent to distribute the same; 
4. That the offense occurred within 1,000 feet of a public parking lot; and 
5. That such acts occurred on or about December 9,2001, in Iron County, State of Utah. 
If the State of Utah has failed to prove any one or more of the previously described elements, 
you must find the Defendant not guilty of the offense of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute, to wit: Marijuana, as charged in Count I of the Information. If 
the State has proved, however, each and every one of the foregoing elements to your satisfaction and 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to find the Defendant guilty of Unlawful Possession 
of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, to wit: Marijuana, as charged in Count I of the 
Information. 
INSTRUCTION NO. f 0 
You are instructed that every person, acting with mental state required for the commission 
of any offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be 
criminally liable as a party to such conduct 
